Abstract Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our observations are influenced by the theories we hold, cannot apply. On the basis of two case studies, I want to show that this consequence of Bogen and Woodward's account is rather unrealistic. More importantly, I also object against Bogen and Woodward's view that the reliability of data, which constitutes the precondition for data-to-phenomena inferences, can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. The case studies I revisit have figured heavily in the publications of Bogen and Woodward and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies. I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI) and that, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of the data (TLA). I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward's account.
Introduction
In 1988 Bogen and Woodward introduced a 'third level' into the classical dichotomy of theory and observations: scientific phenomena. Unlike the notion of phenomena in the empiricist tradition of 'saving the phenomena' defended by van Fraassen (1980) in particular, Bogen and Woodward's phenomena are usually unobservable. However, phenomena can be inferred from observable data, after the reliability of the latter has been secured by various experimental procedures involving statistical inference, data reduction, the exclusion of confounding factors, error and noise control and the like. As a result of these inferences, phenomena are "stable" over different experimental contexts, whereas data typically lack this stability and are often highly idiosyncratic due to the causes peculiar to those contexts (Bogen and Woodward 1988, pp. 317, 319) . Whereas we, for instance, have good reasons to believe that there is one true melting point of lead of 327.43 • C (i.e. the phenomenon), it may well be that none of the values of a particular set of thermometer readings will coincide with the true value. What is more, we may not even know the precise reason for the variation of those data points. The outcome of the latter depends on a multitude of factors, not all of which we will be able to fully control at all times:
The outcome of any given application of a thermometer to a lead sample depends not only on the melting point of lead, but also on its purity, on the workings of the thermometer, on the way in which it was applied and read, on interactions between the initial temperature of the thermometer and that of the sample, and a variety of other background conditions. (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 309) Even though we often may be ignorant about exactly which causes were involved to which extent in the production of the data, we nevertheless may still have good reasons to believe in the existence of the phenomenon of the melting point of lead if we can infer it from the observed values. 1 It is this inferred value, i.e. the phenomenon, which is the "thing-to-be-explained", not the data. In more complex situations than this "toy" example, say in the discovery of weak neutral currents, which has been cited rather extensively by Bogen and Woodward (see also Woodward 1989, 2000) the inference from the data to the phenomena, of course, is not as easy and straightforward as in the example of the melting point of lead. There, background effects, which mimicked neutral currents, had to be taken care of before neutral currents could be established as a genuine phenomenon (see below and Galison 1983 , Pickering 1984 . And yet, Bogen and Woodward claim that this case is analogous to the simple example of the melting point of lead. In both cases, phenomena and data possess the characteristics mentioned above and in both cases phenomena are somehow inferred from the observable data. Unfortunately apart from the occasional (rather vague) reference to statistical techniques, Bogen and Woodward don't say much about the nature of those inferences. 2 In any case, they stress that one must make sure that the inferential "base" (i.e. the data) is not flawed in order for one to carry out inferences to the phenomena:
[T]he question of whether data constitute reliable evidence for some phenomena turns (among other things) on such considerations as whether the data are replicable, whether various confounding factors and other sources of possible systematic error have been adequately controlled, on statistical arguments of various kinds, and on one's procedures for the analysis and reduction of data. (ibid., p. 327)
A point which Bogen and Woodward emphasise very strongly throughout their paper is that the reliability of the data can be secured without higher order theory explaining or predicting why particular data happened to be produced by one's experimental apparatus. On the contrary,
[…] the details of the operation of these causes will be both unknown and enormously complex, so that typically there will be no possibility of explaining why this or that individual data-point occurs. (ibid., p. 334) Yet, Bogen and Woodward hold that we do not need to be able to explain the data in order to ensure their reliability. In particular, the theories we seek to test do not need to explain (or predict) the data. If the tested theories were involved in the procedures for ensuring data reliability, one of Bogen and Woodward's motives for introducing the data-phenomena distinction in the first place would not materialise: rebutting the thesis of theory-ladenness (cf. ibid., pp. 310, 342-347) .
According to the thesis of theory-ladenness, theories interfere on a very low level of cognition: our observations are significantly altered by the theories we seek to test with those same observations. This is usually seen as a threat to scientific objectivity because if the thesis of theory-ladenness were true, and if we were to hold different theories about the world, we would not be able to agree on what we actually observe. Observations thus could no longer serve as the arbiter between different theories. Bogen and Woodward's scheme rules out the thesis of theory-ladenness because it simply denies that there is any direct epistemological link between theories and observations. It is not observations but rather phenomena that theories predict and explain. Phenomena, in turn, cannot be subject to the thesis of theory-ladenness because they (a) are unobservable, and (b) inferred from the data in an epistemologically unproblematic (if somewhat obscure) way.
At this point, one or two comments about the thesis of theory-ladenness are in order. Although philosophers like Thomas S. Kuhn have often been ridiculed as questioning the reliability of our perceptual apparatus and the stability of our perceptions, this is simply not the point about theory-ladenness. For instance van Fraassen in his Scientific Image asked us not to confuse "observing (an entity, such as a thing, event, or process) and observing that (something or other is the case)" (van Fraassen 1980, p. 15; original emphasis) . Van Fraassen illustrates this distinction by calling on a thought experiment in which a member of some isolated tribe is shown a tennis ball. From the behaviour of tribe member, we can infer that she saw the tennis ball (she may throw it, chew it, etc.), but it would be going too far to claim that she has seen a tennis ball-because she does not possess the required concepts.
To say that [s]he does not see the same things and events as we do, however, is just silly; it is a pun which trades on the ambiguity between seeing and seeing that. (ibid).
Even though van Fraassen's distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing that' is a sound one as far as it goes, it is not at all obvious that it really weakens the problem of theory-ladenness. After all it matters rather little for our day-to-day or scientific discourse and practices whether we have the same percepts when we (due to our differing knowledge) actually do see different things. This can be nicely illustrated with the following example from another important sense perception (for which the thesis of theory-ladenness should equally apply, if it is true). Whereas I won't hear much more than strange unfamiliar sounds when someone speaks Chinese, somebody with the knowledge of Chinese is bound to hear meaningful sentences when hearing the same utterances. Someone with a good knowledge of Chinese will not even have to think about what she hears (in terms of grammatical rules). She will just hear meaningful sentences-despite the fact that the (phonetic) sounds the Chinese speaker utters are the same for her and for me! It is this influence of our knowledge/theories on our sensations (despite leaving our "physical" percepts intact), which the thesis of theory-ladenness refers to.
Although Bogen and Woodward in their original paper rejected the thesis of theoryladenness, Woodward has recently indicated that he accepts that at least some forms of theory-ladenness (if somewhat weaker than the form discussed above) do occur in scientific practice. 3 According to one of these forms, the design and the conduction of experiments can be motivated by theories (call this the thesis of "theory-drivenness" of scientific practice). 4 Such a claim is epistemologically rather unproblematic. Whether or not the conduct of particular experiments has been motivated by the theory, which these experiments seek to test, is irrelevant to the (logical) question of whether the data obtained in these experiments do or do not support the belief in particular phenomena, and whether the latter in turn, do or do not confirm the theory's predictions. There is another form of theory-ladenness which Woodward is happy to accept. A theory may provide the vocabulary for interpreting and describing the data. 5 Several questions arise here. How can the theory that explains and predicts the phenomena (call this T(p)) but not the data, provide the interpretational and descriptive framework for the latter (which presumably would require some sort of theory)? If an interpretation is some sort of explanation, doesn't the theoretical interpretation of data not clash with Bogen and Woodward's claim that theories do not explain the data? Why should T(p) provide such a framework for the data in the first place? After all, T(p) only predicts and explains the phenomena, not the data, so why would an interpretation of the data be required? Lastly, given one interpretational framework for the phenomena and one for the data, what is their relationship supposed to be? These are questions, I think, Bogen and Woodward need to clarify.
Yet, in this paper, I want to rather focus on the question of whether Bogen and Woodward's scheme is really as descriptively adequate of scientific practice as they have claimed. In particular, I want to challenge Bogen and Woodward on their thesis that the reliability of data can be secured without the theory which predicts and explains the phenomena that are supported by those data. Take for instance "data reduction", one of the procedures, which Bogen and Woodward quote in this context. Here, Bogen and Woodward have referred to the fact that scanning bubble chamber photographs for significant events is often carried out by theoretically naïve personnel or even machines:
The extent to which such methods of data reduction are independent of any concern with explanation is illustrated by the fact that the person or machine performing these tasks can carry them out without understanding either the theory which explains the interactions for which the photographs are evidence, or the physical principles by which the equipment works. (p. 333) I don't think routines of data reduction, whose carrying out does not require much theoretical understanding, supports Bogen and Woodward's claim that the reliability of data is secured without the theory whose predictions are tested against the data. 6 Even though someone might have the relevant skills to follow a routine that has been given to her, this routine has to be given to her in the first place. It is hard to imagine that the working out of such a data reduction routine, which will involve the choice for and against particular data, could be done without any theoretical understanding of what one ought to see in the data (here: certain events on bubble chamber photographs), if the routine in question is supposed to produce any meaningful results. Rather than assuming the independence of experimental practice from theoretical reasoning when it comes to the reduction of data (and other forms of establishing the reliability of data, as I shall argue in the following), a thorough interplay between the two appears to be much more plausible.
Strong versions of theory-ladenness
After the above clarifications about the traditional concept of theory-ladenness (which I think is correct), and the epistemologically unproblematic concept of theory-drivenness, consider even stronger versions of theory-ladenness: the principled neglect of data due to theoretical predispositions (TLI), and theoretical reasons for belief in the reality of phenomena, which can prove to be critical in the assessment of the reliability of the data and the eventual acceptance of this phenomenon as being real (TLA). In the following I shall substantiate these two stronger forms of theory-ladenness by considering two historical cases which-rather ironically-have been quoted in support of Bogen and Woodward's account. Neither TLI nor TLA seems to be compatible with Bogen and Woodward's account, because theories, according to Bogen and Woodward, simply have no business in establishing the reliability of the data. So even if Bogen and Woodward were to accept the traditional form of theory-ladenness discussed above (which their account doesn't seem to permit without major modifications), I don't think it can handle either TLI or TLA.
Case study I: the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies
The first case I am going to discuss is the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies, which has been discussed by Kaiser (1995) in order to defend Bogen and Woodward's notion of data and phenomena. 7 In the late 1950s and early 1960s it was found that the sea floor is not only positively but also negatively magnetised and that these magnetisations occur in stripes running in a north-south direction. Positive anomalies were conventionally shaded black thus giving the impression of a "zebra" pattern (see Fig. 1 ). This pattern received its currently accepted (and perhaps final) explanation in the so-called Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis (VMM). This hypothesis is essentially a combination of the hypothesis of geomagnetic field reversals (GFR) and the hypothesis of sea floor spreading (SFS). GFR is the idea that the poles of the earth's magnetic field switch repeatedly throughout time so that the North Pole becomes the South Pole and vice versa. SFS is slightly more complicated. It is the hypothesis that sea floor is formed at oceanic ridges by hot mantle rock that cools down at the surface after being elevated by convection currents within the mantle. The sea floor, which has been formed thus, then is pushed towards the periphery by succeeding hot mantle rock and submerges beneath the continental plates where it causes earthquakes and eventually is turned again into magma by the high temperatures within the mantle (see Fig. 2 ). Magnetites within the molten rock, which is elevated from the mantle to the surface, align with the current geomagnetic field, and remain like that when the molten rock cools down. Thus, the past geomagnetic field is "fossilised", as it were, and the striped pattern of Fig. 1 can be explained by an evolving sea floor whose material is magnetised according to past geomagnetic fields (see Fig. 3 ). It is important to note that neither GFR nor SFS were accepted as real phenomena within the scientific community at the time (i.e. the early 1960s) but were regarded as rather speculative. This changed when VMM combined SFS and GFR in order to explain the zebra pattern. Before VMM, the discoverer of the zebra pattern, Ron Mason of the Scripps Institute of Oceanology in California offered his own explanation of the pattern which is highly interesting for the purposes of this paper. Mason reasoned that the positive anomalies were likely to be caused by slabs within the sea floor consisting of "material highly magnetic by comparison with adjacent formation and almost (Raff, 1961, p. 154) certainly a basic igneous rock" (Mason 1958, p. 328) . The concrete form of these positively magnetised slabs could take various forms, some of which are depicted in The Lineated Pattern […] is startlingly apparent when the positive anomalies are shown in grey and the negative anomalies in white. (Raff 1961, p. 147) Note also that Raff spoke of a lineated pattern, rather than of an (alternating) zebra pattern. A perhaps even clearer statement of the same idea can be found in Mason's earliest publication of the magnetic anomalies:
This paper has been mainly concerned with the north-south anomalies because they are the most striking feature of the magnetic map […] (Mason 1958, p. 328; my emphasis) Now, it needs to be emphasised that Mason and Raff's description and explanation of the lineated (rather than the "zebra") pattern cannot be easily dismissed as being just bad science. There is no record that anybody criticising their description and explanation of the pattern their articles made it into the most respected peer-reviewed scholarly journals, and no alternative proposals are reported anywhere (until the VMM hypothesis in 1963, i.e. 5 years after Mason's first publication about the pattern). Even though one could of course simply question the proper judgment of the scientific community at the time, I think it is worth asking why Mason, Raff, and others neglected the negative anomalies. Elsewhere (Schindler 2007 ) I have argued in more detail that Mason and Raff didn't explain the whole pattern but just the subset of positive anomalies because they either weren't aware of the concept of SFS, or they didn't know how to apply it to the pattern. Whatever the case, nowhere in their publications did Mason and Raff mention SFS. 8 Even though they were well aware of GFR and even tried to apply it to the pattern, GFR is not explanatory of the pattern if not combined with SFS, as VMM did later. But because Mason and Raff weren't aware of or didn't know how to apply SFS, they also couldn't recognize a corollary of SFS, namely transform faults and its importance for the interpretation of the pattern (see Fig. 5 , right). Thus, rather than realising that the off-set of the ridges within the pattern was original (which is the case in transform faults), Mason and Raff were assuming that these off-sets were caused by seismic activity along the entire fault line (this being a feature of transcurrent faults; Fig. 5, left) :
The north-south magnetic lineation appeared throughout the area. In several places the pattern was sharply broken along an east-west line, so that the striations above and below it did not match. Although the significance of the lineation [not the alternation of stripes] was-and still is-a mystery, the meaning of the discontinuities was immediately clear. (Raff 1961, p. 148 ; my emphasis) It is assumed that the offset of the two ridges is original and invariant. Rock motion is caused by sea-floor spreading away from the ridges. Notice that in B only the area between the two ridges is expected to exhibit seismic activity Mason and Raff thus tried to reconstruct what they thought was the original lineated pattern by aligning the off-set ridges. 9 Here, of course, the positive anomalies were sufficient and the alternation between positive and negative anomalies of the pattern rather irrelevant. Hence, Mason and Raff's ignoring of the negative anomalies of the pattern can be explained by the fact that that they did not possess or take into consideration the at the time rather speculative idea of SFS. Although a case for the traditional concept of theory-ladenness can easily be made with this episode (perception of the pattern as lineation vs. perception of the pattern as alternation due to different theoretical beliefs), this case supports an even stronger version of theory-ladenness according to which data are bluntly ignored if they are found irrelevant from a particular theoretical standpoint (TLI). 10 Even if Bogen and Woodward were to accept the traditional thesis of theory-ladenness, it is hard to see how their account could accommodate TLI. Bogen and Woodward hold that the reliability of the data can be established without the theory, which is sought to be tested. Now, as pointed out above, the reduction of data, according to Bogen and Woodward, is one of those procedures one applies when trying to achieve the reliability of the data independently of the theory to be tested. Nevertheless, in the case discussed in this section, the theory at stake clearly was involved in the reduction of data. In fact, it led to a principled neglect of some data in favour of others. Hence, Bogen and Woodward's scheme, quite apparently, is not descriptive of scientific practice here.
One may be inclined to dismiss my example on grounds that the theoreticallymotivated reduction of the data did not lead to a real phenomenon. Leaving aside that TLI can observed in cases where this sort of data reduction did result in an actual phenomenon (see Schindler 2008) , again, Mason & Raff's explanatory models were not attacked or criticised by the scientific community for their descriptions of a lin-eated (rather than an alternating) pattern and for their whole-sale neglect of negative anomalies. And if one wants to defend an account that is descriptive of actual scientific practice (and this is clearly what Bogen and Woodward seek to do 11 ) one cannot simply discard such cases because, clearly, Mason & Raff's work was seen as good scientific practice and the lineation of anomalies was clearly perceived as a genuine phenomenon at the time. It therefore appears plausible to give theories a more active role in the assessment of data and in the discovery of the phenomena in scientific practice. This will become even more apparent in the other case I want to consider in the following.
Case study II: the discovery of weak neutral currents
The discovery of weak neutral current (WNC) figures quite heavily in Bogen and Woodward's publications. It is cited as a prime example for their notions of data and phenomena. Yet, as I shall argue in the following, the discovery of WNC does not support their account, when correctly construed.
WNC are a form of weak interaction between subatomic particles, mediated by the so-called Z 0 boson. In contrast to their charged current counterpart (mediated by a W + or W − boson), WNC are characterised through their lack of muons (µ − ) in neutrino-nucleon scattering experiments (see Fig. 6 ; right). Since only charged particles leave tracks in bubble and spark chambers (which are used to detect WNC) and since neutrinos (and Z 0 bosons) are electrically neutral, the non-production of muons became the main identifier of WNC. This way of identifying WNC, however, is highly problematic. In spark chamber experiments, where the production and detection of muons is spatially separated, wide-angle muons could escape the detector. 12 In bubble chamber experiments muons could get stuck in the shielding of the chamber. If one didn't take extra care in estimating these undetected but nevertheless present muons, one could end up counting as WNC events what in fact were merely charged current events. Moreover, in bubble chamber experiments, incoming neutrinos could knock off neutrons within the shielding, which in turn would propagate into the chamber where they would scatter off hadrons, thus emulating WNC events (Fig. 7) . The latter came to be known as neutron background and it became the main challenge in bubble chamber experiments to estimate this neutron background correctly in order to discern the genuine WNC events from the charged current events that only "mimicked" them.
In the history and philosophy of science literature, the discovery of WNC (with the pioneering work of Galison 1983) is not uncontroversial. Pickering (1984) has claimed that already bubble and spark chamber experiments in the 1960s were capable of producing WNC and that they actually did produce data which indicated Fig. 6 Neutrino-nucleon scattering. a Charged current event, mediated by a W + boson, which carries a positive charge from the reaction v → μ − to the reaction n → p (where v = neutrino, n = nucleon, p = proton, μ − = muon); b neutral current event, mediated by an electrically neutral Z 0 boson (also characterised as massive analogue of the photon). Neutral current events produced in scattering are characterised by the charge remaining the same for incoming and outcoming particles (upper and lower parts of the diagrams, respectively). From Pickering (1984) Fig. 7 Neutron stars in bubble chamber. This figure shows two forms of neutron stars triggered by a neutrino beam. Above A neutrino hits a nucleus, producing a muon (μ − ), hadrons, and a neutron (n). The neutron, again, hits another nucleus, producing even more hadrons, but without producing a muon. The event caused by the neutron can unproblematically be associated with the neutrino beam (and hence be identified as a charged current event), which is why these events are called "associated events" (AS) [also called neutron stars (n * )]. All this happens within the visible chamber. Below neutron star is triggered in the invisible shielding, starting in the invisible shielding, making the muon event (μ − ) undetectable. The latter gives the appearance of a neutral current event [non-associated or "background event" (B)]. The interaction length of the AS events within the chamber serves as the basis for estimating the number of unobservable B events by means of Monte Carlo programmes. Diagram from Haidt (2004) the presence of WNC. The question then of course is why WNC were not discovered in the 1960s but rather in the 1970s? Pickering has argued that this was so because WNC were a "socially desirable phenomenon" (p. 109) in the 1970s after theoretical physicists had come up with the Salam-Weinberg model which postulated WNC. Pickering concluded that "particle physicists accepted the existence of the neutral current because they could see how to ply their trade more profitably in a world in which the neutral current was real" (ibid., p. 87; my emphasis). Miller and Bullock (1994) however, have challenged Pickering's interpretation by denying Pickering's claim that the 1960s bubble chamber experiments were capable of producing a WNC "signal". As I have shown elsewhere (Schindler under review) , 13 Miller and Bullock's argument doesn't go through. On the other hand, I don't think one needs to fall back on any sociological arguments in order to make sense of the discovery. But then, how does one explain that the discovery was made in the 1970s and not in the 1960s? Perhaps, one should take a closer look at how the eventual discovery was made in 1974. In this year, both the HPWF and the CERN groups each published a paper, both of which are usually regarded as having established WNC as a genuine phenomenon. Here is how both groups, rather surprisingly for "discovery papers", conclude: 14 A possible, but by no means unique, interpretation of this effect [muonless events] is the existence of a neutral weak current. (Benvenuti et al. 1974 p. 800; my emphasis) It has to be emphasized that the neutral current hypothesis is not the only interpretation of the observed events. (Hasert et al. 1973, p. 20; added emphasis) Likewise, a review article in Physics Today reads:
Although both groups [Gargamelle and HPWF] suggest that they may be seeing neutral currents, they also offer alternative explanations. And many experimenters are sceptical that either group has demonstrated the existence of neutral currents. (Lubkin 1973, p. 17) In other words, even in the articles that (retrospectively) came to be seen as "discovery papers", quite obviously a fair amount of scepticism about the reality of WNC remained. But it comes even worse than that. As Perkins, a former researcher at CERN has pointed out recently (see also Fig. 8 ):
It is interesting to note that the HPWF result is actually inconsistent with the Salam-Weinberg theory, while the Gargamelle result shows a value of R [i.e., NC/CC] that is only about two-thirds of the present-day value […] . The value deduced for sin 2 θ W = 0.38 ± 0.009 has to be compared with the present value of 0.23. (Perkins 1997, p. 442) In other words, the data of 1974 were not at all as compelling as we may think they should be (because they were either inaccurate or inconsistent with currently accepted values) given that we take it that WNC were discovered in that year by the two groups. Hence one may again wonder, with much more urgency than before, how the research 13 In this publication, I discuss Bogen and Woodward's characterisation of the discovery of WNC in terms of their notions of data and phenomena in more detail. There, I also have a few things to say about Mayo's construal of the discovery in terms of her statistical error account. 14 The first quote is by the HPWF group the second by the CERN group. Note that the paper by the HPWF group was already submitted August 1973 and that the CERN group published a short paper in 1973, which they elaborated in the article that appeared a year later. See Pickering (1984) for details. Perkins (1997) community eventually became convinced of the reality of WNC in 1974? Since there wasn't any other evidence for WNC than the one provided by the experiments of the HPWF and CERN groups, we can assume that the data themselves obviously were insufficient for making a discovery claim. So the reasons for the research community to accept existence claims about WNC must be extra-empirical. Now, I have already said that I'm not willing to resort to any socio-economical arguments here. I simply think they are not necessary. I certainly don't think physicists are as opportunistic as Pickering suggests when he says that they welcomed WNC just because it allowed them to "ply their trade more profitably". Nor do I think one should draw any other relativist conclusions. Rather, I believe the reasons why physicists accepted WNC as a genuine phenomenon-despite remaining doubts about the diminishment of neutral background-has to be sought in the properties of the theory that postulated WNC.
The Weinberg-Salam model, 15 proposed in 1967 and re-normalised in 1972, unified theories of electromagnetic and weak interactions into a single theory. Since the Weinberg-Salam model required the existence of WNC, the Weinberg-Salam model provided, in the form of the unificatory benefit, good reasons for the belief in WNC. Of course, the Weinberg-Salam model, by itself, would have been far from being sufficient for physicists to accept WNC as real. But, as we saw above, the experiments quite apparently were not sufficient either for a discovery claim. Nevertheless the data combined with the theoretically motivated "need" for WNC did the trick! Although doubts about the conclusiveness of the experiments remained, these doubts were outweighed by the benefits the Weinberg-Salam model offered in terms of conceptually unifying electromagnetic and weak interactions.
Contrary to the conclusions of this section, Bogen and Woodward in their publications assumed all along that a clear case for the existence of WNC could be made simply on the basis of the experimental evidence in 1974. 16 And yet, the discovery of WNC is only a case supporting their account if one makes this (false) assumption. But quite obviously, the experimental procedures aiming at achieving the reliability of the data were not sufficient for establishing the reality of WNC. Rather, as I suggested here, it was the "tested" theory that provided good reasons (in the form of unificatory power) for accepting WNC as real. Nothing in Bogen and Woodward's account, however, allows for such.
Conclusion
In their well known article "Saving the phenomena", Bogen and Woodward (1988) made four central claims: (i) phenomena in science, more often than not and contrary to traditional intuitions, are unobservable, (ii) the phenomena are inferred from observable data, (iii) the reliability of the data is secured on the basis of experimental and statistical means, (iv) theories do not predict or explain data but rather phenomena. As a corollary to (i) and (iv), Bogen and Woodward also rejected the thesis of theory-ladenness (roughly, what we see is influenced by the theories we hold). Although Bogen and Woodward did not mention any other forms of inference in their original article (making (ii) seem like a necessary condition for the inference of phenomena), they recently retreated on claim (ii) and conceded that their scheme should be complemented by other forms of inferences, most notably by theory-driven inferences. This is largely unproblematic. Although one may be interested in how Bogen and Woodward would spell out those kinds of inferences, which they haven't even mentioned in their publications to date, their retreat on claim (ii) seems to leave their other claims and their mutual consistency intact. Woodward has furthermore partially backed down on claim (iv), conceding that data may well be described and interpreted in terms of theoretical vocabulary. As pointed out above, this leads to serious conceptual difficulties, which Bogen and Woodward would need clarify. But regardless of this, there are much more serious questions to be raised about the descriptive adequacy of their account with respect to claim (iii) and its relation to claim (iv). Some of these questions arise from re-visiting two case studies, which Bogen and Woodward and others have quoted in support of the descriptive adequacy of their account. The first case study concerns the discovery of the so-called zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies (Kaiser 1991 (Kaiser , 1995 and the second case study regards the discovery of weak neutral currents (Bogen and Woodward 1988; Woodward 1989 Woodward , 2000 . With respect to the first case study I showed that not only the traditional thesis of theory-ladenness is substantiated but a case can be made for an even stronger version of theory-ladenness according to which the data are neglected if they appear irrelevant from a certain theoretical perspective (I called this TLI). In the second case, a positive property of the theory at stake, namely the unifying power of the Salam-Weinberg model, obviously played a critical role in assessment of the reliability of the data (I called this TLA). Both case studies directly challenge claim (iii) and claim (iv) of Bogen and Woodward's account. Since Bogen and Woodward and others have depicted the first and the second case discussed here as paradigm examples for their distinction, I don't see how they could dismiss the cases as "untypical", "exceptions" or the like.
On a last note, despite my grave disagreements with Bogen and Woodward that I articulated in this paper, however, where I do agree with them is that there is a distinction to be made between data and phenomena and that many important phenomena in science are unobservable. It is here where they have made a significant contribution to the philosophy of science.
